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1. Introduction
While economic research has not yet definitely settled whether and how taxes affect long-term
economic growth it is indisputable that the design of the tax law has real effects on the levels
of important macroeconomic aggregates such as consumption, investment, income per capita,
and welfare. A recent empirical literature has argued that macroeconomic effects of tax policy
may be larger than previously thought (e.g. Romer and Romer, 2008, Mountford and Uhlig,
2008) and tax alleviation is high on the policy agenda in many OECD countries. The present
article continues the literature that tries to assess the quantitative impact of tax reform on
macroeconomic aggregates by calibrating and simulating a dynamic general equilibrium.1
Usually this literature assumes that a change of taxes hits the economy unexpectedly and is
then expected to last forever. While this might be true in some cases, in reality a tax reform
is frequently pre-announced and thus expected quite a while before it actually comes into effect
(see the discussion in Alvarez et al., 1998 and Domeij and Klein, 2005). Likewise tax cuts are
sometimes temporary. They are announced and thus expected to expire after a certain time.
This is, for example, true for the tax relief acts during the Bush administration from 2001 and
2003 of which many measures were announced to end at a certain date between 2007 and 2010.
These observations have motivated the present work, which tries to assess within the dynamic
general equilibrium paradigm the macroeconomic consequences of anticipated tax reforms and
temporary tax cuts.
Anticipated and/or temporary tax changes are analyzed in a small micro-economic literature
on firm investment.2 There, dynamics are driven by adjustment costs (and perhaps additionally
by different tax treatment of old and new capital). While the micro-research has produced many
interesting insights it cannot be used to assess how aggregate macroeconomic performance is
affected by tax policy. The partial-equilibrium approach treats wages and interest rates as given
and thus neglects important feedbacks through factor price adjustments. Also, since there are
no households, the consequences of tax policy on welfare cannot be explored.
Our work shares probably most with two articles by Judd (1985, 1987) that investigate antic-
ipated and temporary tax changes in a dynamic general equilibrium model and which, like the
1An incomplete list includes Lucas (1990), King and Rebelo (1990), Greenwood and Huffman (1991), Cooley and
Hansen (1992), Baxter and King (1993), McGrattan (1994), Stokey and Rebelo (1995), Laitner (1995), Mendoza
et al. (1997), Kim (1998), Mendoza and Tesar (1998), Grüner and Heer (2000), Strulik (2003), McGrattan and
Prescott (2005).
2Summers (1981), Abel (1982), Auerbach (1989), Alvarez et al. (1998), and Gourio and Miao (2007).
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present paper, explain adjustment dynamics by the desire of households to smooth consumption.
In fact, our model can be conceptualized as an extension of Judd’s by a corporate sector and
a decision problem of firm finance. Within a somewhat simpler institutional framework Judd
computes in a quite sophisticated way the savings and welfare effects of tax reform analytically.
That way he is able to obtain welfare effects of marginal tax changes.3
Yet, tax reforms in reality are non-marginal and in fact sometimes quite drastic. Taking
adjustment dynamics properly into account their (non-marginal) quantitative impact on welfare
and other aggregates cannot be assessed analytically. Here, we thus propose a new numerical
method for their assessment. The method is in detail described in Trimborn et al. (2008) and
the general idea of it will be briefly reviewed later in the present paper. Our approach allows us
to solve a dynamic general equilibrium model for non-marginal, anticipated or temporary tax
changes. The numerical method has a one-to-one correspondence to phase diagram analysis and
is thus very intuitive. It nowhere requires a linearization or other approximation of the economic
model and allows to obtain impulse responses up to an arbitrarily small, user-specified error.
The concrete framework that we use for our investigation consists of a neoclassical growth
model with explicit consideration of a corporate sector and a firm finance decision. For our
purpose this setup combines several advantages. It allows for the introduction of a rich set of
tax parameters and a discussion of real and financial impacts of tax reform and it is still simple
enough to be reduced to a two-dimensional dynamic system, and anticipation effects can be
understood qualitatively by phase diagram analysis.4
The next section describes the model and the implementation of anticipation effects. Section
3, using phase diagrams, investigates anticipated enactment and termination of tax reforms
qualitatively. Section 4 explains how our numerical method exploits the principles derived from
phase diagram analysis, Section 5 presents our results, the quantitative impact of anticipation on
adjustment dynamics of several macroeconomic aggregates and on welfare. Section 6 concludes.
3Anticipated tax changes in dynamic general equilibrium are also investigated in Howitt and Sinn (1989) and
Domeij and Klein (2005). These articles, however, are pursuing different questions than the present one. Domeij
and Klein explore how results on optimal capital taxation are modified when tax changes are anticipated. Howitt
and Sinn investigate gradual tax reforms where the tax rate changes continuously and converges towards a final
value. Their problem could perhaps best be conceptualized as an un-anticipated tax reform that introduces a
whole path of future tax changes, which are then, once the whole reform is known, anticipated.
4Tax policy in this framework has been investigated by Turnovsky (1982, 1990), Sinn (1987), Osterberg (1989),




2.1. Firms. We consider a continuous time, infinite horizon model of a corporation maximizing
present value of the firm (as in Sinn, 1987, Auerbach, 2001) augmented by costly debt (as in
Strulik, 2003). Let V denote the value of the firm, S the flow of funds from the issue of new
shares, and D dividends. Following the standard literature (the “new view”, Auerbach 2001) we
focus on both D and S being non-negative, i.e. we exclude share repurchases.5 Let furthermore
r denote the gross interest rate on bonds, τd the tax rate on dividends, τp the tax rate on private
interest income and τc the tax rate on capital gains. All variables are generally functions of time
but for notational convenience we omit a time index unless necessary for understanding. Tax
rates are treated parameterically since they change either only occasionally (at discrete events)
or not at all.
No-arbitrage at capital market equilibrium requires that the after-tax return of bonds equals
the return obtained from investment in shares consisting of after tax earnings from capital gains
and dividends.
(1− τp)rV = (1− τc)(V̇ − S) + (1− τd)D (1)
Integrating equation (1) and applying the terminal condition that discounted firm value con-















The implementation of tax depreciation follows Sinn (1987). A proportion z of a unit of
investment can be deducted immediately and the remainder is tax-deductible over time with
the rate of economic depreciation (δ). Additionally to preferential tax treatment of depreciation
other subsidies may directly reduce the cost of investment. In order to be brief we subsume all
investment specific allowances in z as investment tax credit. Let Tr denote the tax on corporate
income at rate τr, Π accounting profits, I net investment and Ḃ new debt. Gross dividends are
then defined by
D = Π+ Ḃ + S − I(1− zτr)− Tr . (3)
Firms face an exogenously growing level of technology A and produce with constant returns
to scale with respect to capital K and labor in efficiency units AL. The production function F
5Our results nowhere hinge on this assumption, we make it only in order to avoid distracting case differentiation.
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has positive and decreasing marginal returns. Each unit of labor receives a wage w. Firms face
unit costs of debt which consist of the market interest rate and a further cost depending on their
debt ratio (B/K), which may best be thought of as agency costs of debt. Both costs are tax
deductible. Because the corresponding costs function a(B/K) is not explicitly micro-founded,
we merely require that its curvature ensures an interior solution of the maximization problem.6
Accounting profits are given by Π = F (K,AL)− wL− δK − rB − a(B/K)B − τrzI and the
corporate tax is given by Tr = τrΠ. Inserting these expressions into (3) we get gross dividends
(4).
D = (1− τr)
[
F (K,AL)− wL− δK − rB − a(B/K)B − τrzI +




The corporations part of the model is completed by the law of motion for capital (5).
I = K̇ . (5)








F (K,AL)− wL− δK − rB − a(B/K)B − τrzI + (Ḃ + S − (1− τrz)I)/(1− τr)
}
− S + qKI + qBḂ + µSS
where qK and qB denote the costate variables associated with capital and debt and µD and
µS are the slack variables associated with dividends and share issue. Let capital per labor in
efficiency units be defined as k := K/(AL), the debt ratio as b := B/K, and production per
effective labor as f(k) := F (k, 1), f ′(k) > 0, f ′′(k) < 0. The first order conditions for an optimal
choice of investment (I) and employment (L), share issue (S) and new debt (Ḃ) are summarized
in (6).
w = A[f(k)− f ′(k)k] (6a)
1− 1− τd
1− τc





(1− τ2r z) = qK (6c)
6A micro-foundation of agency costs could be integrated into the model at the expense of further formal compli-




























− q̇B . (6f)
We assume (and confirm numerically below) that our representative firm distributes regular
dividends, i.e. D > 0, such that the complementary slackness condition, µDD = 0 requires
µD = 0. According to the US tax system (before 2003) τd > τc. This implies that according to
(6b) µS > 0 such that S = 0 implying that firms issue (regularly) no new shares and retained
profits are the preferred method of accumulating equity capital. This, however, does not imply
that firms will never issue new shares. If tax rates faced by the corporation sector change, firms
may want to adjust their equity capital instantaneously. But since output and profits are flows,
retained earnings cannot jump so that firms have to rely on S > 0 in order to increase their
equity instantaneously. This way, the “new view” is compatible with the empirical observation
of occasional issues of new shares.
According to (6c), marginal costs of investment from shareholders’ perspective equal marginal
value of investment (measured by qK). Condition (6d) requires that the marginal value of
new debt equals its marginal costs: substituting one Dollar of retained earnings by new debt
increases dividends by (1− τd)/(1− τc). The left hand side of (6e) gives net marginal returns on
capital allocated within the firm from shareholders’ perspective. It equals net marginal returns
on capital outside the firm (net interest payments plus depreciation of value). Note that an
additional unit of capital does not only increase output by f ′(k)− δ but also has an additional
positive effect by lowering the debt ratio. The left hand side of (6f) gives marginal costs of
debt within the firm consisting of interest costs plus marginal leverage costs, which equal the
marginal returns on debt outside the firm (net returns on bonds plus depreciation of value).
The necessary conditions are sufficient and an interior solution is – if it exists – unique, if the
non-maximized Hamiltonian is strictly concave in states and controls. With respect to capital
and debt strict concavity of the Hamiltonian requires that total costs of leverage, a(B/K)B, are
strictly convex in K and B, implying:
2a′(b) + a′′(b)b > 0 , (7)
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which is assumed to hold henceforth. Finally, we assume that the tax burden is higher when
investment is financed by equity than when it is financed by debt:
(1− τp) > (1− τc)(1− τr) . (8)
The assumption ensures that firms are always realizing an interior solution for financial structure,
i.e. that they are never completely equity financed. A tax advantage of debt finance is empirically
supported for the US and many other OECD countries (OECD,1991, Graham, 2000, 2006).
From the first order conditions (6) we derive the optimal debt ratio as an implicit function of
the capital labor ratio and the tax law.
0 = f ′(k)− δ + a′(b)b2 −
[
(1− τ2r z)(1− τp)
(1− τp)− (1− τc)(1− τr)
]
(a(b) + a′(b)b). (9)








where ρ is the time preference rate and 1/σ the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. House-
holds supply one unit of labor, receive a wage wt, pay a tax on wage income at rate τw, and
receive lump-sum government transfers, T . Their financial wealth, W , consists of equity hold-
ings, V , and bond holdings, BH , and their budget constraint is given by
ḂH = (1− τw)w + (1− τp)rBH + θD + T − S − τc(V̇ − S)− C .
After inserting ḂH and V̇ from (1) into Ẇ = V̇ + ḂH the budget constraint reads
Ẇ = (1− τw)w + (1− τp)rW + T − C . (11)




(1− τp)r − ρ
σ
. (12)
2.3. Capital market equilibrium. Generally, a capital market equilibrium requires W =
V + B. The interesting case here occurs at those occasional events when a tax reform triggers
a restructuring of firm capital. These instantaneous movements of financial funds change debt
and equity holdings of firms and thus the value of firms but they cannot change aggregate
6
wealth W if the tax change was pre-announced and thus expected. Aggregate wealth is a stock
variable that cannot jump at the moment of an unexpected event. Intuitively, an expected
jump of wealth would indicate arbitrage opportunities. These, however, are ruled out by the
no-arbitrage condition. Thus at the point of time of financial restructuring, denoted by t̃,
∆BH(t̃) = ∆V (t̃) (13)
However, if we allow for a discrete financial restructuring at t̃, firms may issue a mass of
new shares at t̃ or pay exceptional dividends at t̃. We denote this change by S(t̃) and D(t̃),
respectively, and consider it for firm value by applying the Dirac delta function.7 Accordingly,















But by how much does firm value change? To answer that question we calculate firm value


























Consider first instantaneous restructuring through issues of new shares S. For ∆t → 0 the first
integral at the right hand side converges to zero since D remains to be a flow and D(t̃) = 0.
With contrast, S has a discrete mass at point t̃ so that the second integral at the right hand
side converges to S(t̃). Likewise, if there is restructuring through dividends, the second integral
converges to zero for ∆t → 0 whereas D has positive mass and the first integral converges
towards −θD(t̃)/(1− τc). Summarizing we have
∆V (t̃) =

S(t̃) if ∆V (t̃) > 0
− θ1−τcD(t̃) if ∆V (t̃) < 0.
(15)
7We denote the Dirac delta function by the symbol δ. The function is defined by δt̃(t) =
{
+∞, t = t̃
0, t ̸= t̃
and∫∞
−∞ δt̃(t) dt = 1, see Li and Wong (2008) and the citations therein.
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Equations (13) and (15) describe the general equilibrium effects of financial restructuring and
its consequence on firm value. In words, if firms restructure by paying exceptional dividends,
households reinvest income by buying additional bonds. If firms issue new shares, households
adjust by selling bonds.
2.4. Government and General Equilibrium. Government revenues are completely paid out
to households in form of either transfers or interest payments on government bonds. Using
Ricardian equivalence, the path of government debt necessary to balance the current budget is
represented by a time series of lump sum income transfers.
The economy consists of a continuum of households and a continuum of firms both of measure
one. GDP is used for private consumption, investment and agency costs
Y = C + I + δK + a(b)B = F (K,AL) .
Inserting this into (5) and dividing by K we obtain growth of aggregate capital as:
K̇/K = [f(k)/k − a(b)b]− C/K − δ . (16)
Next, we introduce the consumption-capital ratio c = C/K and assume that technology grows
at constant rate γ. Using (12) and (16), the economy is represented as the following system in
k and c.
k̇/k = f(k)/k − a[b(k)]b(k)− c− δ − γ (17a)
ċ/c = [(1− τp)r(k)− ρ]/σ − (γ + k̇/k). (17b)
The main deviation from the standard neoclassical growth model is that the interest rate is
not explicitly given by capital productivity but “only” implicitly determined on the financial
market. To see this clearly, derive from (9) financial structure b as an implicit function of
firm size k. Then conclude from (6d) and (6f) r + a(b) + a′(b) = r(1 − τp)/[(1 − τc)(1 − τr)],
which expresses the interest rate implicitly as a function of firm leverage. It can be shown
that leverage and interest rates are positively correlated (dr/db > 0) and that larger firms are
relatively less indebted (db/dk < 0). This provides, as for the standard neoclassical growth
model, a negative correlation between capital stock and returns dr/dk < 0 and ensures a unique
and saddlepoint-stable equilibrium (See Strulik,2003, for a proof of these claims).
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Given the saddlepoint property, obtaining adjustment dynamics after a permanent, non-
anticipated tax reform is straightforward. At the time of the tax change, the state variable
k cannot jump and consumption jumps on the stable manifold along which the economy travels
towards the new steady-state, determined by the after-reform tax law. Generally, growth and
welfare effects of these kinds of tax changes have been investigated in many articles and in par-
ticular, for the current model in Strulik (2003). If the tax change is anticipated and/or known
to be non-permanent, however, assessing adjustment dynamics is somewhat more involved.
3. Anticipated Tax Policy: Qualitative Analysis
In the real world, people may know both the point in time when a tax policy comes into
effect and the point in time when it terminates – if it terminates. For better understanding,
however, it is useful to investigate the effects that arise from pre-announcement and from known
expiry separately. Linguistically, we may distinguish an anticipated tax reform, i.e. a policy that
is regarded to be permanent and which will become operative in the future at a certain pre-
announced date (like, for example, elements of Germany’s “Agenda 2010”) from a temporary tax
cut, which is enacted more or less spontaneously and known to be terminated at a certain date in
the future (like many elements of the 2001 and 2003 tax relief acts of the Bush administration).8
3.1. Anticipated Tax Reform. Consider, as an illustration, an anticipated and permanent
cut of the corporate tax rate which is announced at time t0 and which becomes effective at
a future date t̃ > t0. At time t0 the economy is assumed to rest at the pre-reform steady-
state. Because firms and households know in advance that the reform will happen, they use the
opportunity to adjust their behavior already from time t0 onwards.
Adjustment dynamics can be conveniently analyzed in a phase diagram. In Figure 1 the
panel on the left introduces the pre- and after reform equilibria and general movements within
the phase diagram. The panel on the right shows adjustment dynamics of the specific reform.
Initially the economy is situated at (k∗old, c
∗
old). Grey curves show the initial isoclines and grey
arrows indicate the direction of motion of trajectories around the steady-state. A cut of the
corporate tax rate τr increases the incentive to take up more debt in order to finance additional
8We ignore elements of uncertainty stemming, for example, from commitment problems or (unexpected) change
of the incumbent party. For a related paper on policy uncertainty, see Alvarez et al. (1998).
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investment. Thus at the after-reform steady-state both k∗ and b(k∗) will be higher. The ċ = 0–
curve moves to the right because of higher capital accumulation (lower marginal return on
capital) and the k̇ = 0–curve shifts downward because of higher agency costs of debt. Black
lines indicate the new isoclines and the black vector field indicates the direction of movement of
trajectories associated with the new equilibrium.9






































ċ = 0ċ = 0
The basic intuition for the understanding of adjustment dynamics is that there can only be
a jump of household wealth and thus of consumption at the moment of an unexpected event.
As explained above, the assumption of no-arbitrage rules out jumps if everything is expected
and thus correctly anticipated by households and firms. If agents would not expect the tax
reform, the economy would rest at the initial steady-state from t0 to t̃. At t̃ households and
firms would rearrange their decision plans such that the economy would immediately jump on
the stable manifold associated with the after-reform steady-state, represented by a dashed line
on the right panel of Figure 1. This behavior follows stringently from the logic of the first
order conditions and the transversality condition requiring that the economy converges towards
the steady-state. Because there cannot be any further jumps, and because any trajectory not
starting on the stable manifold will never arrive at the steady-state, the economy has to be on
the manifold at t̃.
9Theoretical analysis identifies a higher capital stock at the new equilibrium but leaves the change of steady-state
consumption indeterminate. In line with our numerical results below Figure 1 assumes that the shift caused by
interest rates (i.e. through the savings channel) is more pronounced than the shift caused by agency costs of debt
(through the credit channel) such that consumption is actually higher at the new equilibrium.
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When households and firms anticipate the tax reform they choose already a different pattern
of investment and consumption during the time between first knowledge and coming into effect
of the policy, i.e. during [t0, t̃]. At time t̃, there is no new information so that households’ wealth
evolves continuously. Hence, the shadow price of wealth and consumption evolves continuously
as well. For this to be the case, households choose an initial value of consumption ca(t0), such
that the resulting trajectory implied by the vector field meets the stable manifold at t̃. This
path is represented in the panel on the right hand side of Figure 1 by a solid line.
In order to understand the movement of transitional dynamics, note that until t̃ the grey
vector field associated with the pre-reform steady-state applies whereas the black vector field
associated with the after-reform steady-state applies from t̃ onwards. A higher level of con-
sumption compared with the old steady-state level at t̃ would result in a trajectory leading
in north-westward direction. This trajectory would radiate from the new stable manifold and,
hence, could not meet it at time t̃. Therefore, consumption has to jump down at t0.
This downward shift of consumption means that the announcement of the tax cut already
spurs investment before the reform actually comes into force. We can also conclude that the
downward jump of consumption has to be smaller than for an unanticipated reform. Trajectories
starting with c < c∗old under the old tax regime point to the south-east. Hence, any c
a(t0) lower
than cu(t0) would result in a trajectory leading away from the new stable manifold. The economy
would never arrive at the after-reform steady-state.
Financial structure of firms, with contrast, does not change discontinuously at the time when
the reform is announced, i.e. at time t0. For given macroeconomic aggregates and constant
policy the structure of finance depends solely on current taxes and the stock of capital. Implicitly
differentiating (9) we find ∂b/∂τr > 0. Thus, financial structure of firms changes discontinuously
in favor of equity when the reform becomes operative, i.e. at time t̃. Because of no-arbitrage
this financial restructuring must not affect aggregate wealth (and consumption) of households.
Qualitatively, we know from equations (13) and (15) that firms issue new shares at t̃ such that
expenditure by households (S) equals the gain in aggregate firm value (∆V ). The quantitative
impact, however, that an anticipated tax reform has on financial structure, capital accumulation,
consumption, and welfare, is unknown. It will be investigated in Section 5.
3.2. Non-permanent Tax Policies. Consider now the opposite case and suppose that a tax
law becomes known at the moment when it becomes effective (for example, because it is known
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that a proposal once it has passed legislature will be retroactively applied) and that the law
changes the tax rate only for a finite period of time, which is known by the economic agents.
Afterwards, the original policy applies again. Typical examples are many traditional Keyne-
sian policies, like temporary investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation rules. As an
illustration we thus consider a non-anticipated increase of z which is known to last for t̃ time
periods.

































An increase of the investment tax credit z makes investment more attractive and leads to
higher capital accumulation and lower interest rates. It shifts the ċ = 0-curve to the right. The
k̇ = 0-curve shifts down a little because b(k∗) and the entailed agency costs of debt are higher
at the new steady-state. However, the policy change is known to be only temporary. In Figure
2 black isoclines and vector fields are associated with the initial equilibrium, which is also the
terminal equilibrium. Grey isoclines and vector fields are associated with the equilibrium towards
which the economy temporarily converges (k∗temp, c
∗
temp). General dynamics are introduced in
the panel on the left. Dynamics of the specific policy are shown in the right panel.
For the construction of adjustment dynamics note that at the time when the temporary tax
credit becomes effective the grey vector field applies while at the time when the policy expires
the economy must have reached the stable manifold leading to the old (i.e. the permanent)
steady-state. This behavior follows the same logic as explained above. Economic agents receive
no new information at the time when the policy expires because the expiry date is already known
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in advance. Consequently, no-arbitrage rules out a jump of aggregate wealth implying that the
associated shadow price of wealth and consumption cannot jump as well.
Because the policy is temporarily expansive, adjustment along the stable manifold has to be
from above as indicated in the panel on the right of Figure 2. In order to reach the manifold along
a path that obeys the grey vector field, the initial jump of consumption must be in direction
of lower c. The policy implies a steep spontaneous increase of investment with subsequently
falling investment rates. Note that the inherent logic of adjustment dynamics also implies that
the trajectory describing the optimal consumption strategy crosses the k̇ = 0 isocline from
below before it reaches the manifold. Otherwise, the economy would never return to the initial
steady-state. The model thus predicts that investment falls below its initial level at a time when
the favorable investment credit is still effective. Finally, observe that consumption reaches its
highest level at the moment when the temporary policy is terminated.
Generally, phase diagrams of anticipated reforms have already been analyzed elsewhere (Sum-
mers, 1981, Abel, 1982, Judd, 1985). We have been reviewing these principles in such a detailed
manner because we are exploiting them with our numerical solution technique, the application of
which to anticipated tax reform and temporary tax relief is the major innovation of the present
paper.
4. Method and Calibration
4.1. Method. For calculating adjustment dynamics we apply the relaxation algorithm as in-
troduced by Trimborn et al. (2008). The principle of relaxation is to construct a large set of
non-linear equations, the solution of which represents the desired trajectory. This is achieved
by a discretization of the involved differential equations on a mesh of points in time. The set
of differential equations is augmented by algebraic equations representing equilibrium condi-
tions or (static) no-arbitrage conditions at each mesh point. Finally, equations representing
the initial and final boundary conditions are appended. The whole set of equations is solved
simultaneously.
The special property of our optimization problem is that the size of the jumps fulfilling (13)
and (15) follows from the continuity of capital (k), wealth (W ), consumption (C) and the re-
spective shadow prices. A jump in financial structure is thus optimal according to (13) and (15)
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if it is accompanied by a continuous movement of consumption, capital, and wealth. The relax-
ation algorithm is demanding just this property by treating differential and algebraic variables
conceptually differently. For differential variables there are differential equations present (e.g.
for k) whereas this is not the case for algebraic variables (e.g. for b). The distinction is important
because it implies that differential variables are connected along time through difference equa-
tions whereas no such connection exists for algebraic variables. This feature allows algebraic
variables to jump whereas differential variables have to be continuous (potentially with corners).
Thus, while the algorithm forces W to evolve continuously, its components V and B can exhibit
interior jumps of the same magnitude, but with opposite signs. This way the algorithm reveals
the extraordinary payout of dividends (or the extraordinary issue of shares) at the time when a
policy comes into effect and firms adjust financial structure.10
4.2. Calibration. We calibrate the model with U.S. data. We use a Cobb-Douglas production
function and set the capital share α to 1/3. Instead of imposing a linear or quadratic form for
the unit costs of debt, we try to find parameters of the isoelastic function a(b) = a0b
a1 such that
the simulated behavior of the representative firm generates the correlation between taxation and
leverage estimated for the average U.S. firm by Gordon and Lee (2001, 2007). We set τr = 0.35
according to the marginal tax rate applying for U.S. corporations at the highest tax bracket.
For tax rates on private capital income we tried to calibrate the initial steady-state such that
it reflects the U.S. tax law before the (mostly temporary) tax cuts of the Bush administration.
Following Gourio and Miao (2010) we set τp = 0.25, τd = 0.25, τr = 0.35 and the statutory
capital to 0.20. The tax on capital gains is an effective rate and following Poterba (2004) we
set tc = 0.2/4. Finally we set τw to the value of 0.36, which has been estimated by Carey and
Tchilinguirian (2000) as the average effective tax rate on labor income, and — following the
approach in Sinn (1987, pp. 57-60) — z = 0.4. From various other calibration studies we adopt
ρ = 0.02 and γ = 0.015.
The remaining parameters are determined in the following way. Eqs. (9), and (17) evaluated
at the steady state are required to yield b∗ = 0.194 (the average debt ratio according to Gordon
and Lee), a long-run capital output ratio of k∗1−α = 2.16, and a long-run gross investment
ratio of (I + δK)/K · (K/Y ) = (δ + γ)k∗1−α = 0.17 (both values according to Mendoza and
10A detailed description of the numerical method is available at: http://kaldor.vwl.uni-hannover.de/???.
The MATLAB code is available upon request.
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Tesar, 1998). This implies a net investment ratio I/K of 3.24 and determines δ = 0.064 and
σ = 2.8. Finally, the parameters of the debt cost function are determined by requiring a(b) = 0
for b = 0 and that our benchmark economy reproduces Gordon and Lee’s (2001) estimate that
a five percentage point increase in τr raises the debt ratio by about 1.8 percentage points. This
provides the estimates a0 = 7.3 and a1 = 4.7.
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5. Anticipated and Temporary Tax Policy: Quantitative Analysis
5.1. Pre-Announced Corporate Tax Reform. Many OECD countries have recently enacted
quite drastic cuts of corporate taxes or are planning them for the future. Corporate tax reforms
are frequently known several years in advance (Alvarez et al, 1998, Domeij and Klein, 2005).
In line with these observations we assume a tax cut of τr of 10 percentage points and start our
investigation at year 0, from which onwards it is known that in year 5 there will be a corporate
tax reform.
In Figure 3 we show the consequences for major economic variables: capital stock (k), con-
sumption (c), aggregate wealth (W ), debt ratio (b), firm value (V ), net investment rate I/Y ,
dividends per share (D/V ), tax revenue, and economic growth of per capita output (gy). Values
for macroeconomic aggregates are detrended and expressed relative to their pre-reform steady-
state values. Values for economic rates (i.e. b, I/Y , and gy) are expressed in percentage points.
In each panel the after-reform steady-state value to which the economy eventually converges is
indicated by a circle. Solid lines show adjustment dynamics for the pre-announced reform. For
comparison, dashed lines show adjustment dynamics when the same reform hits the economy
unexpectedly at t = 5.
The trajectory obtained for consumption confirms our earlier results from qualitative analysis.
If the policy is anticipated, consumption falls already as soon as the reform becomes known
indicating that households (shareholders) are eager to smooth consumption (wealth) and react to
the expected lower taxes in the future by initiating an investment spurt today. The anticipation
effect is quantitatively significant. If the tax reform comes unexpected, consumption stays at
its initial level for the next 5 years and then falls by about twice as much as for the anticipated
reform. In terms of current consumption (and thus instantaneous utility) ignorant households
11An even larger effect of corporate taxes on firm finance than suggested by Gordon and Lee’s estimate has
recently been found by Djankov et al. (2000) in a cross-country study. They estimate that a 10 percentage point
increase of the corporate tax rate raises the debt to equity ratio by 45 percentage points.
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are better off during the first five years and worse off afterwards when they have to adjust
towards the new steady-state from a much lower level.




























































































































Adjustment paths for a 10 percentage point cut of the corporate tax rate that comes into effect in year
5. Solid lines: announcement at year 0. Dashed lines: unexpected reform. Macroeconomic aggregates
measured in relative deviation from pre-reform steady-state; macroeconomic rates measured in percentage
points.
As a consequence of anticipation the capital stock adjusts very smoothly. There is almost no
kink visible at the time when the reform becomes operative. At the moment when the policy
is enacted the capital stock is already about 2 percent above its pre-reform steady-state. This
head-start advantage over the ignorant case is caught up only eventually when the economy
reaches the new steady-state implying that pre-announcement of the reform makes firms bigger
over the whole adjustment path.The finding of a size-effect from pre-announcement has been
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obtained previously in partial equilibrium (Summers, 1981) and is here confirmed in general
equilibrium.
With contrast to real variables, adjustment behavior of financial structure is much more
abruptly when the reform comes into effect and almost insensitive to pre-announcement. Firms
react to the new tax law by replacing debt with equity thereby, as explained in Section 2,
issuing new shares. This way the model can explain the occasional observation of new share
issues. The model explains these issues as optimal reaction on tax reforms, which also happen
only occasionally (or, generally, as optimal reaction to rare events that are exogenous to the
single firm). Optimal financial policy is determined by capital stock and the tax system (and
not by the shareholders’ desire to smooth consumption). Thus the prior knowledge that a reform
will happen has little effect. The only, almost invisible, movement of the debt ratio during the
announcement phase is caused by the increasing capital stock.
More capital and less debt implies that firms have to cut back dividends per share (D/V ).
The total value of shares, however, increases because of the increasing firm size. If the tax cut
is pre-announced share value increases already before the reform.
As a consequence of increasing share value, households hold more shares and accumulate more
wealth. Household wealth jumps at the moment when surprised firms adjust their financial
structure by issuing new shares. For the pre-announced reform this happens immediately, at
the moment of announcement. For the non-announced reform it happens at the moment of
enactment. As consequence, consumption falls for the pre-announced reform already during the
announcement phase, indicating the incentive to save and invest already before the policy comes
into effect..
The early investment spurt is also visible in the I/Y -panel. If the reform is anticipated, most
of the total increase of investment happens already in the pre-reform phase with only a small
jump when the reform comes into effect. It is beneficial for firms to accumulate capital stock in
advance, which allows for high profits at the time when the tax on retained profits is reduced.
If the reform comes unexpectedly, the jump of investment at reform time is much higher and it
remains to be higher after reform. Nevertheless, as inspection of the k panel has made clear,
the head-start advantage from pre-announcement with respect to capital stock (and profits) is
only recovered as time goes to infinity.
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Behavior of investment translates one-to-one into behavior of the growth rate of output per
capita. Output per capita growth is predicted to be higher for an unanticipated reform. Again,
this does not indicate at all a benefit from ignorance. Higher growth after the enactment of the
reform is insufficient to make up for the higher growth before reform that is taking place when
the reform comes expectedly.
************* Finally, we consider tax revenue. The model predicts that the tax cut leads in
the end, after considering all adjustment processes, to (slightly) higher tax revenue as compared
to the pre-reform steady-state. During the adjustment phase, of course, tax revenue is tem-
porarily lower. If the reform is anticipated, tax revenue falls already during the announcement
phase because of lower revenue from dividend taxation. But the earlier expansion of the econ-
omy under an anticipated reform helps the economy to break even earlier with the pre-reform
tax revenue. The pre-reform revenue is reached in year 15, i.e. 10 years after the reform comes
into force as compared to 13 years for the unexpected reform. In any case, the reform becomes
self-financing quite rapidly.
In Figure 4 we present impulse responses to a pre-announced vs. unexpected increase of the
investment tax credit by 20 percentage points. In many ways adjustment dynamics resemble
those obtained for the corporate tax reduction albeit at smaller size, initially as well as eventually.
Yet there are also qualitative differences between both reforms discernable.
To begin with, firms get more into debt when the higher tax credit comes into effect. This
effect operates only temporarily in order to finance the higher investment triggered by the reform.
While conventional wisdom would have probably predicted that investment will be delayed until
the investment tax credit becomes operative, we observe, again, an investment spurt during the
announcement phase.
This at first sight puzzling behavior is explained by costly debt. Firms anticipate that there
will be large investments when the investment tax credit is granted. The entailed investment
costs cannot be served spontaneously by retained earnings since profits are a flow variable. Issue
of shares is also no option since the policy (with contrast to the corporate tax cut) leaves the
financial structure desired in the long-run unaffected. Thus higher investment cost are expected
to be served by higher debt. The implied higher leverage will increase the cost of debt. In order
to mitigate the cost-effect from higher leverage, firms invest, i.e. accumulate capital, already
18

























































































































Adjustment dynamics after a 20 percentage point increase of z that comes into effect in year 5. Solid
lines: announcement at year 0. Dashed lines: unexpected reform. Macroeconomic aggregates measured in
relative deviation from pre-reform steady-state; macroeconomic rates measured in percentage points.
in the announcement phase. During this period they pay less dividends and retain earnings in
order to display a lower debt ratio (B/K) when the reform comes into effect.
While the dividend ratio returns to its pre-reform value, total firm value is (with contrast
to the corporate tax cut) predicted to be lower after the reform. Because long-run financial
structure remains unchanged, permanently higher total investment has to be financed by both
higher debt and higher equity. A higher stock of equity is accumulated through more retained
earnings i.e. less dividends, which is reflected by a lower total value of firms (leaving the dividend
ratio D/V unchanged).
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Interestingly, the model predicts for anticipated and unexpected reform diametrically opposed
behavior of dividends when the reform comes into effect. If the reform arrives unexpectedly firms
adjust by both higher debt and lower dividends in order to finance the higher investment needs.
If the reform was anticipated, however, firms have already adjusted through lower dividends
during the announcement phase and start to pay higher dividends (compared to last period, not
compared to initial steady-state) when the reforms comes into effect.
Again, the reform generates enough expansive power to be self-financing in the end and
produces even a mild surplus of tax revenue. During transition, however, tax revenue is below
its pre-reform value for a much longer time than observed for the corporate tax cut. If the
reform was announced in advance, tax revenue breaks even after about 25 years. As for other
variables as well, adjustment dynamics for the unexpected reform lag behind indicating, again,
a genuine welfare gain from announcement.
In Figure 5 we consider an anticipated vs. unexpected reduction of the tax rate on private
capital income (including dividends) by 10 percentage points at time t = 5.Roughly speaking,
results are less favorable than those obtained for the corporate tax reform. This is at first sight
surprising since a reduction of τp is the only tax instrument that increases the net return on
capital in the long-run. We can distinguish an interest rate channel inducing households to save
more and a credit channel inducing households to hold a higher share of wealth in the form of
bonds. Both effects are initiated simultaneously if the reform hits the economy unexpectedly. If
the reform is anticipated, the credit channel operates mainly at the time when the reform comes
into effect whereas the interest rate channel operates right from announcement onwards.
The head-start advantage from pre-announcement is again visible. When it becomes known
that taxes on capital income will be lower in the future, households and firms immediately start
to save and to invest. Again, early investment generates a size-effect from announcement that
is only caught up as time goes to infinity if the reform hits the economy unexpectedly. During
the announcement phase investment is mainly financed through retained earnings, i.e. lower
dividends. When the reform comes into effect the tax advantage of debt increases and induces
firms to raise their debt ratio and thus, in financial market equilibrium, induce households to
hold a larger share of their wealth in bonds. When the reform comes into effect, firms do not
20

























































































































Adjustment Paths for a 10 percentage point reduction of τp comes into effect in year 5. Solid lines:
announcement at year 0. Dashed lines: unexpected reform. Macroeconomic aggregates measured in
relative deviation from pre-reform steady-state; macroeconomic rates measured in percentage points.
only adjust by demanding more debt but also by paying higher dividends, which in turn implies
that total firm value is lower after the reform.12
The most interesting differences between anticipated and unexpected reform are observed for
consumption and investment. If the reform comes anticipated, almost all of the expansive power
of the reform has already taken place during the announcement phase. As a consequence the
model predicts for the time when the reform becomes operative a small drop of the investment
12Note that the one time payment of a special dividend at t = 5 is not visible in Figure 5, which shows just the
flow of regular dividends.According to (14) we compute a one time increase of dividends by 11% in the year when
the reform becomes operative. Comparatively, the impact of the reform on special dividends is much larger than
its impact on regular dividends.
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rate (compared to the previous period not compared to the pre-reform state). The opposite is
true for the unexpected reform that unfolds its highest momentum when the reform comes into
effect. In that case the model predicts a fall of aggregate consumption and an increase of the
investment rate and economic growth rate at time t = 5.
Next we evaluate the welfare consequences of tax reforms and, in particular, the extra welfare
that can be generated through pre-announcement of a reform. For that purpose we employ
the Lucas’ (1990) methodology and measure the welfare gain of a tax reform as the constant
relative increase in consumption that equates intertemporal utility from remaining in the state
before the reform and switching towards the consumption path induced by the reform. Results
are reported in Table 1. By way of example we also check for the robustness of results. It is
well known that the shape of adjustment dynamics is most drastically affected by the choice
for the elasticity of marginal utility σ (see, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). Our
benchmark calibration has estimated σ = 2.8. We report additionally results when σ assumes
values that are 33 percent higher and lower, respectively and where we have adjusted ρ such
that the model parameterization in any case implies a steady-state growth rate of 1.5 percent.
The first row in Table 1 shows results for a 10 percentage point reduction of τr announced
5 years in advance. The left part shows the total welfare gain of the reform and the right
part shows the extra welfare gain stemming from pre-announcement of the reform (compared
to an unexpected reform). For a better assessment of results it may be helpful to recall that
one percent welfare gain (from abolishing capital taxation) has been appraised as the largest
gain that quantitative welfare economics can provide (Lucas, 1990) and that the welfare gained
by eliminating all business cycles has been estimated to be somewhere between 0.008 and 0.1
percent (Krusell and Smith, 1999).
The total welfare gain of the corporate tax reform is estimated to be roughly one third of a
percentage point, a figure that accords well with earlier results (Strulik, 2003). Compared to
the total gain the extra gain from pre-announcement is smaller than one might have expected.
The reason is that the extra utility gained along the higher consumption path after reform
enactment (as compared to a surprising reform) is to a large degree counterbalanced by lower
utility during the anticipation phase. Figuratively speaking, in the consumption panel of Figure
3 the discounted utility differential produced by the large areas between solid and dashed line
before and after enactment is of similar size. Then again, a welfare gain from anticipation of
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the reform of about 0.04 percent may equally well be assessed as quite large when compared to
the gain from eliminating business cycles.
The size of the welfare gain is quite robust against alternative choices of σ. Not surprisingly,
the lower σ the higher the welfare gain from tax reform. Interestingly, this result takes over
to the additional gain from anticipation. If σ is smaller, the welfare gain from anticipation is
somewhat higher as well. Summarizing we can conclude that anticipation of a corporate tax
reform increases the welfare gain produced by the reform by roughly 10 percent.
Table 1: Welfare and Anticipation Effects of Tax Reforms
Policy reform welfare gain anticipation effect
σ low σ benchmark σ high σ low σ benchmark σ high
∆τr = −0.1 0.390 0.364 0.343 0.043 0.040 0.037
∆z = 0.2 0.092 0.084 0.078 0.013 0.013 0.012
∆z = 0.1 0.047 0.043 0.040 0.006 0.006 0.005
∆z = 0.3 0.136 0.124 0.114 0.021 0.019 0.018
∆τp = −0.05 -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005
∆τp = −0.05 (Ramsey) 0.170 0.155 0.143 0.027 0.026 0.024
Welfare gain measured in consumption equivalents and expressed in percent. See text for further
explanations.
Next we report welfare consequences for an increase of the investment tax credit by 20 per-
centage points. Results are, in principle, similar to the case of corporate tax reduction. While
the total welfare gain is smaller the extra gain from anticipation is, relatively speaking, some-
what larger and estimated to be about 15 percent of the total gain of the reform. Assuming
lower and higher values of the tax credit we have checked for non-linear size effects, but found
(almost) none within a sensible range of ∆z. As a rule of thump an x percentage point increase
of the tax credit generates an 0.04 percentage point welfare gain.
Finally, we consider a 5 percentage point reduction of the tax rate on private capital income.
Although the steady-state effect on consumption (and thus welfare) is mildly positive, taking
adjustment dynamics into account the reform causes a mild welfare loss. This loss is produced by
the initially low consumption and is further amplified by financial restructuring of firms. Driven
by the tax cut, firms hold more debt and cause higher agency costs of debt. The isolated effect
of anticipation is, of course, positive. Again the gain from anticipation is, although absolutely
small, relatively speaking quite large.
23
5.2. Welfare Effects of Temporary Tax Cuts. In this section we present the macroeconomic
consequences predicted for temporary tax cuts. We begin with a temporary rise of the investment
tax credit by 20 percentage points which is granted immediately and lasts for 5 years. Since
the policy is temporary, the economy returns to its initial steady-state in the long-run. Despite
its temporary character the policy may have positive consequences on welfare. For an intuition
reconsider the right hand side panel of Figure 2. Consumption drops immediately and – following
the logic explained in Section 3 – reaches the “old” manifold in year 5, i.e. when the tax relief
expires. Along the manifold it travels from above towards the initial steady-state, which is
reached as time goes to infinity. Since the manifold lies everywhere above the initial steady-
state we can infer that consumption lies most of the time above its initial steady-state level
c∗.
The results of our numerical computation, represented by solid lines in Figure 6, confirm this
insight. Consumption drops initially in order to free resources for the additional investment
triggered by the temporary tax cut. During the implementation phase (i.e. the period where the
temporary policy is operative) consumption is on the rise again, breaks even with steady-state
consumption after about 3 years and reaches its maximum at year 5 when the temporary tax
cut terminates. It then adjusts slowly towards the initial steady-state. 20 years after the policy
has terminated consumption is still (slightly) above steady-state level.
To finance the additional investment firms have initially to recur on debt because retained
earnings cannot jump. During the implementation phase firms finance the increased investment
costs by paying less dividends and consequently firm value drops temporarily. Tax revenue,
naturally, drops at the time when the larger tax credit is granted. It subsequently rises because
profits and employment rise, and lies above steady-state level after the tax cut expires because
the “old” tax rates apply to temporarily higher capital stock, employment, and profits.
Dotted lines in Figure 6 show adjustment dynamics when the higher tax credit is granted
for 10 years. Impulse responses are structurally similar but display, non-surprisingly, higher
amplitudes. Capital stock is now accumulated for a longer period above steady-state level and
consequently it takes longer until the positive effect vanishes after the policy has been terminated.
Interestingly, the picture hints at a non-linearity. A doubling of the implementation phase from
five to ten years leads to more than a doubling of the maximum amplitude, an effect that is in
particular visible for capital stock and consumption. From this, one may infer that doubling the
24















































































Adjustment Paths for a 10 percentage point increase of z in year 0. Solid lines: policy is known to end in
year 5. Dashed lines: policy is known to end in year 10. Macroeconomic aggregates measured in relative
deviation from pre-reform steady-state; macroeconomic rates measured in percentage points.
length of the implementation period is more than twice as good for welfare, a hypothesis that
we investigate next.
Table 2 shows the computed welfare gains and verifies that the temporary policy has indeed
positive consequences on welfare. The welfare gain is, however, quite small compared to that of
a permanent tax cut. If the extra tax credit is granted for 5 years, the model predicts a welfare
gain of 0.0023. The figures on the left show that if the policy is extended over a longer time the
welfare gain rises indeed in a non-linear fashion. Doubling duration of the implementation phase
produces a welfare gain of 0.0155, i.e. the welfare gain is more than six times higher. Again, the
result is quite robust against alternative specifications of parameters as exemplarily shown for
alternative values of σ.
The next row in Table 2 shows that structurally similar results are obtained for a temporary cut
of the corporate tax rate. Here, we have assumed that a 10 percentage point cut of τr is granted
for five or ten years, respectively. Again, the policy arrives unexpectedly but agents know about
its temporary character. The temporary tax relief spurs investment implying a temporary loss of
consumption. As before, welfare raises because capital, output, and consumption overshoot their
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Table 2: Welfare Effects of Temporary Tax Cuts
Policy reform 5 years tax cut 10 years tax cut
σ low σ benchmark σ high σ low σ benchmark σ high
∆z = 0.2 0.0030 0.0023 0.0019 0.0191 0.0155 0.0132
∆τr = −0.1 0.0542 0.0504 0.0481 0.1208 0.1108 0.1042
steady state values. Since the economy spends much longer time above its steady-state value
than below, the gains in consumption outweigh the initial losses due to enhanced investment
activities.
The size of the welfare gain from temporary corporate tax cut is larger than for the investment
tax credit, but, of course, it has already been found to be much larger in case of a permanent
tax reform. The non-linearity appears now at a much smaller scale than for the investment tax
credit. If the implementation period of the corporate tax cut doubles to ten years, the welfare
gain is about 2.2 times higher.
Finally, we more systematically evaluate how much of the gain from a permanent reform can
be produced by an otherwise identical temporary tax policy. In Table 3 we have compiled the
welfare gain resulting from a 10 percentage point reduction of the corporate tax cut against the
length of duration of the tax relief. In parenthesis we show how large this effect is in percent
of the welfare gain produced by a permanent tax cut. For example, if the policy lasts indeed
forever (as assumed in the first row), the welfare gain is 0.408 percent, which is, of course, 100
percent of the permanent effect. As a robustness check for our results we calculate again the
welfare gain for the same policy change when σ is 33 percent lower or higher than assumed for
the benchmark model.
For an assessment note that Table 3 assumes that policies come into effect immediately. A
comparison with results from Table 1 reveals that the welfare gain from having the permanent
reform immediately is higher than the welfare gain from have the same reform in 5 years from
now taking into account the extra welfare gained from announcement. In other words, the fact
that announcing a reform in advance is always welfare enhancing ceteris paribus, i.e. holding
the date of enactment constant, does not imply that a generally favorable reform should be
“artificially” delayed in order to realize this extra gain from announcement.
As expected, if the tax relief lasts for 100 years, the deviation of welfare from the one obtained
for a permanent change is very small. If the tax relief is granted for 20 years the deviation is
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Table 3: Welfare Effect of Temporary vs. Permanent Tax Relief
duration of tax relief welfare gain
σ low σ benchmark σ high
∞ 0.438 (100%) 0.408 (100%) 0.384 (100%)
100 0.433 (99%) 0.403 (99%) 0.380 (99%)
20 0.234 (53%) 0.215 (53%) 0.201 (52%)
10 0.121 (28%) 0.111 (27%) 0.104 (27%)
5 0.054 (12%) 0.050 (12%) 0.0048 (13%)
Policy: corporate tax cut of 10 percentage points. In parenthesis: total welfare
gain compared to the one resulting from an everlasting tax relief.
already significant. The welfare gain is 0.22 percent, which is roughly half the gain obtained for
the permanent policy. A ten year tax relief yields just about 25 percent of the welfare gain of
the respective permanent policy. For a 5 year tax cut the welfare gain melts down to a mere 12
percent. Results are again quite robust against parameter variation.
Welfare gains from permanent tax policy changes have been analyzed by several numerical
studies in the past. The question may have been occurred whether the findings could be used
to assess the welfare gain resulting from an actual policy change that is known to be non-
permanent. This would be very convenient since welfare consequences of permanent policy
changes are much easier to compute (which may be actually one reason for why they are more
prevalent in the literature). The results compiled in Table 3, however, indicate that we would
accept large errors if we treated a temporary tax relief as if being permanent. The error made
is, naturally, decreasing in the duration of the actual tax relief.
With Figure 7 we explore the underlying adjustment dynamics. The figure shows the optimal
consumption path triggered by a tax relief of different duration. The individual paths are easily
identified since we know from phase diagram analysis that consumption peaks when the policy
is terminated. The path that peaks at t = 5 thus reflect the consumption trajectory provoked
by a 5 year tax relief. The path that peaks “outside of the figure” reflects the 100 year policy,
and the dashed line shows the steady-state consumption eventually assumed if the tax cut were
indeed permanent.The solid horizontal line shows consumption at the old state, i.e. without any
tax relief. All numbers are measured relative to initial consumption. Remaining at the initial
steady-state thus yields one unit consumption at each period of time forever.
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Figure 7: Temporary Tax Cuts and Optimal Consumption Paths
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Policy: corporate tax cut of 10 percentage points. The curves show consumption
optimal paths for alternative duration of the policy. Each curve peaks when the
temporary tax relief expires, i.e. after 5, 10, 20, 100 years.
While the initial drop of consumption is of comparable magnitude for all policies, the most
striking result visible in Figure 7 is how small the maximum yield of consumption gets when
the duration of the tax relief is shortened. The comparatively small welfare gain computed for
a temporary tax relief of 5 or 10 years thus originates chiefly from the fact that consumption
never – not even for a short time – comes close to the consumption yield that a permanent policy
eventually produces. The Figure impressively documents the supply-side mechanism. In the end,
everything is driven by supply of capital (or, more generally, factor accumulation). A tax cut
of short duration leads to a short spurt of investment activities and a small (and, of course,
only temporary) increase of factor endowments. Consequently, it can support only a short and
small increase of consumption and welfare. In conclusion, even if a tax cut is quite drastic, it is
ill-judged to expect large positive consequences on welfare when the relief is simultaneously of
short duration, for example, if it is operative for “only” one legislative period.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have applied a new method to evaluate the quantitative macroeconomic
consequences of anticipated tax reforms and temporary tax cuts. The mechanics of the numer-
ical algorithm can be retraced by phase diagram analysis, a fact that facilitates an intuitive
explanation of the obtained impulse response behavior.
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We have found that adjustment dynamics for anticipated policy reform differs significantly
from an unexpected reform. In particular, we have demonstrated that a pre-announced cut of
taxes causes a sizeable investment spurt during the announcement phase, i.e. before the reform
becomes operative. The investment spurt generates a head-start advantage of the announced
reform vis a vis a surprising (but otherwise identical) reform, which is only caught up as time
goes to infinity. For a reduction of corporate taxes we predict that a five year lead of pre-
announcement generates an extra welfare gain of about 10 percent of the total gain from the
reform, which is estimated to be around a third of a percentage point for a ten percentage
point tax cut. A structurally similar investment spurt and extra welfare gain arises from pre-
announcement of a higher future investment tax credit. Results are less favorable for taxation
of private capital income. The again positive announcement effect is not sufficient to turn a
generally (mildly) negative welfare effect positive.
Besides these quantitative results we have also found and explained important qualitative
differences between pre-announced and surprising tax reforms. These differentiated effects are
caused by adjustment of financial structure, which is modelled as endogenous in our setup. For
example, the model predicts for a cut of the corporate tax rate that firm values (stock market
prices) rise when a pre-announced reform becomes operative while they are predicted to fall
in case of a surprising reform. Similarly dividends are predicted to rise when a pre-announced
investment tax credit becomes operative but are predicted to fall in case of a surprising policy.
In case of a cut of capital income taxes the model predicts investment rates to fall (vis a vis
the previous period) when the reform comes into action while they are predicted to rise in case
of a surprising policy. With respect to actual policy evaluation these findings suggest that one
has to sort out carefully whether a reform came expectedly or surprisingly, in particular, for the
interpretation of events around the time when a reform becomes operative.
With respect to tax revenue our model supports generally a quite optimistic view on corporate
tax cuts, which is further improved through anticipation. Tax revenue after a 10 percentage point
cut of taxes is predicted to break even with pre-reform level after 13 years. This time span is
reduced to 10 years if the reform was announced 5 years in advance. In the end the tax cut yields
a (mild) surplus of revenue. Similar, though quantitatively less important results are obtained
for higher investment tax credits. Again, predictions are pessimistic for a cut of capital income
taxes where revenue is predicted to never catch up to pre-reform level.
29
Finally, we were able to demonstrate a genuine welfare gain arising from a temporary cut
of the corporate tax rate and from a temporarily higher investment tax credit. While small
initially the gain rises with length of the implementation period. In particular for the investment
credit we have found a non-linearity. Doubling the implementation period more than triples the
welfare gained. Nevertheless, we have also demonstrated that temporary policy drastically
underperformes vis a vis a permanent policy, in particular when the implementation period is
short. For example, if the corporate tax cut is granted for five years it generates around 11
percent of the welfare obtained from a permanent tax cut of equal size. This implies that large
errors are excepted when a tax policy which is known to be temporary is evaluated as if being
permanent.
We have generally found that there is much more variation in impulse responses of important
macroeconomic variables than indicated by the aggregated welfare gain. The aggregation over
time hides the fact that ups and down of investment, profits and consumption before and after
reform are to a large extent counterbalancing each other. We thus expect important intergenera-
tional distribution effects from announcement. An extension of our method towards a Blanchard
(1985) – Yaari (1965) setup seems to be a promising project for the future.
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